By Patrick Comerford
Foreign Desk Editor
The Yugoslav parliament voted overwhelmingly yesterday in favour of a plan to abolish the Balkan federation and replace it with a looser union between its last remaining members, Serbia and Montenegro.
The move clears the way to work out the details of a new constitution from the blueprint, negotiated by the EU in March. The west is keen to head off a drive by Montenegro for independence that it fears would destabilise the region.
The parliaments of Serbia and Montenegro already had approved the plan, which would consign Yugoslavia to history after more than seven decades of existence in various forms. But analysts and diplomats still expect protracted negotiations over the details.
The upper house passed the plan by 23 votes to six against and the lower house approved it by 74 to 23.
“Many people will see this day as the day when Yugoslavia died, because the name is no longer mentioned in the agreement - the new state is called Serbia and Montenegro,” the Serbian Deputy Prime Minister and Yugoslav deputy, Mr Zarko Korac, said.
The two republics would have broad autonomy within one internationally recognised state with its own president, parliament, cabinet and army to replace the federal institutions.
The original plan, signed on March 14th in Belgrade, envisaged a new constitution would be ready for approval by the three parliaments by the end of June. However, many analysts, diplomats and politicians say interpretations of the blueprint and ambitions for the new union already differ so widely that the prospect of agreement by then is remote.
The Speaker of the Lower House, Mr Dragoljub Micunovic, said he expected the new draft constitution to be finished by the autumn. Yugoslavia would cease to exist when it is adopted.
Pro-independence Montenegrin parties, for whom the scheme is at best a necessary evil to retain Western favour, set great store by a clause that allows them to revive independence plans in three years. But pro-Yugoslav parties there want close links to Serbia, and a directly elected parliament with a strong mandate.
For now, at least, the EU and NATO Secretary-General Mr Javier Solana have headed off Montenegrin independence. They feared that a planned breakaway referendum would encourage further violent redrawing of borders in the Balkans.
Yugoslavia – meaning southern Slavs – was formed at the end of the first World War, itself triggered by the independence aspirations of the south Slavs of the Balkans, with Serbia leading a unification movement.
The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria in Sarajevo triggered the first World War. At the time, the only independent south Slav states were Serbia – then incorporating Macedonia – and Montenegro. Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina were under the rule of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which crumbled at the end of the first World War. In 1915 Serbia and Montenegro were overrun by the Central Powers and Serbian troops retreated to the Greek island of Corfu.
In July 1917 representatives of the south Slavs proclaimed a kingdom under Peter I of Serbia, and Montenegro adhered in 1918. In December 1918, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was proclaimed, and it was renamed Yugoslavia in 1929.
Yugoslavia joined the Axis pact in 1941, and Germany soon invaded. After the second World War, Tito came to power, but Yugoslavia was expelled from the Moscow-led Cominform in 1948.
Yugoslavia later became a leading light in the international non-aligned movement. After Tito's death in 1980, a collective presidency was introduced. In 1991 the Yugoslav republics of Croatia and Slovenia declared independence. With the rapid departure of four of Yugoslavia's original six constituent republics, the remaining two - Serbia and Montenegro - formed a new federation in 1992. Now the name “Yugoslavia” is being consigned to history, replaced by the new Federation of Serbia and Montenegro.
• This news report was published in The Irish Times on Saturday 1 June 2002.
COMERFORD WAY: Patrick Comerford’s online journal on Anglicanism, theology, spirituality, history, architecture, travel, poetry, beach walks ... and more
Showing posts with label Yugoslavia. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Yugoslavia. Show all posts
06 April 1999
Is NATO's cause for war ‘just’?
RITE and REASON
Patrick Comerford
The calls for an Easter ceasefire in Kosovo serve to underline the fact that most Christians hold that war is inconsistent with the teachings of the New Testament and that the participation of Christians in any violent conflict must be limited and constrained by the demands for justice and peace.
A leading English Sunday broadsheet has proclaimed: “This is not a just war”. But when is a war just? Is the “just war” theory simply a formula to allow Christians to participate in any and all wars? And, in the light of recent events, can the present war against Milosevic and the Yugoslav government be regarded as a “just war”? Over the centuries, the Christian tradition has produced three contrasting approaches to the moral dilemma posed by war: pacifism, Crusades, and the “just war” theory.
Christian pacifism, with its roots in the Sermon on the Mount and the practice of the early church, demands total opposition to all wars. However, the call to peacemaking in the Sermon on the Mount (Matthew 5: 9) is not a call to maintaining an unjust cessation of violence or to seeking peace at any price. Nor do the demands of peace always take priority over the demands of justice.
Those who invoke the principles of pacifism in the present conflict are open to condemnation if we have not spoken out against the tyranny of Milosevic, condemned the treatment of refugees and asylum-seekers in this country, or challenged the pervasive antipathy towards Muslims that has allowed the West to ignore the plight of Muslims in Bosnia and ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.
The Crusades found their initial justification as defensive action aimed at protecting Christian pilgrims to Jerusalem, but quickly took on all the characteristics of the jihad or Muslim holy war in which, ironically, Muslims became the victims.
The theological justification of Crusades has long been abandoned, but still has resonances in the way conservative Christians in the US talked about communist eastern Europe during the Cold War, or even today in the way many talk about a looming “clash of civilisations” between the West and the Islamic world.
The third Christian approach has been formulated as the “just war” theory. The concept of a just war owes its original formulation not to Biblical principles but to Aristotle, who first used the term, Cicero and others.
The theory was first framed by St Augustine, who was exercised by the problem of when a Christian might take part in a war with a good conscience.
For him, all wars remained sinful, and war could only be waged in “a mournful spirit”. War involved resorting to a lesser evil only in the hope of preventing a greater evil and of restoring justice. He accepted that the command to love our neighbour included a duty to defend the vulnerable against attack, while the commandment to love our enemy placed moral limits on the use of force in defending the vulnerable.
Augustine offered specific criteria for assessing the morality of warfare: the cause must be just, as must be the intention of those who embark on war; war must be declared by the proper, legitimate authority; and the conduct of the war must be just in every particular.
Augustine’s theory was later refined and developed in the 13th century by Thomas Aquinas, and by 16th-century Spanish and Dutch theologians. Their formula for a “just war” passed into international law, so that Francisco de Vitoria and Huig de Grotius are known to this day as the “Fathers of International Law”.
* * *
THE “just war” doctrine does not seek to legitimise, and still less to glorify, war. Today it is widely accepted by jurists and theologians alike that six conditions must govern a decision to go to war (jus ad bellum) and two conditions must govern its conduct (jus in bello). The six conditions governing any decision to go to war are: declaration by a legitimate authority; just cause; right intention; last resort; reasonable hope of success; and a due proportion between the benefits sought and the damage war will bring.
The two conditions which govern the conduct of war are: the principle of proportionality and the guaranteed immunity of non-combatants. Each of the conditions must be met for any conflict to meet the criteria for a “just war”.
Is it possible to regard the present conflict as a just war? Of course, it might even be asked whether this is a war. There has been no formal declaration of war; instead, there has been a formal declaration of the beginning of hostilities, and this has not come from a head of state. Whether the Secretary-General of NATO is an appropriate authority is open to question.
Undoubtedly, there is a just cause if the intention is to stop ethnic cleansing. But some British officials have said NATO’s aims and intentions are merely to show President Milosevic their resolve. Showing one's determination or flexing one's muscles does not justify bombing city-centres or putting maternity hospitals within firing range: has NATO clearly set out its intentions so that its cause is just?
The refusal of the Belgrade government to sign the Rambouillet accord despite weeks of negotiations may allow many to argue that this war is a last resort. But was there ever a reasonable hope of success? The just war theory also demands a due proportion between the benefits sought and the damage caused by war. If intensified ethnic cleansing was a foreseen consequence, then surely the sufferings brought about in the past two weeks are out of all proportion to any benefit in bringing Milosevic to the negotiating table.
On the other hand, NATO cannot be blamed for the actions of paramilitary racists, no more than the allied bombers can be blamed for Hitler intensifying the annihilation of Jews in the concentration camps.
Unfortunately, one of the weaknesses of the “just war” theory lies in the fact that it is often only long after a war is over that we have the time and the luxury to determine whether all conditions were met. In the meantime, we can only accept that all our moral decisions are contingent and at best penultimate rather than having ultimate or final value.
We are left to confess that war is evil, and accept that in circumstances such as these many people of good will resort to a lesser evil in the hope of preventing the perpetration of a greater evil.
Some years ago, when the Harvard theologian, Prof Harvey Cox, was asked who the new enemy of the West would be to replace eastern Europe in the post-Cold War world, he replied: “The poor”. Some weeks later the same question was put to the missionary theologian, Bishop Leslie Newbigin, who replied: “Islam”. It is ironic that in the present conflict those who are suffering most are both poor and Muslim.
Patrick Comerford is an Irish Times staff journalist and an Anglican lay theologian
This ‘Rite and Reason’ column was published in The Irish Times on Tuesday 6 April 1999
Patrick Comerford
The calls for an Easter ceasefire in Kosovo serve to underline the fact that most Christians hold that war is inconsistent with the teachings of the New Testament and that the participation of Christians in any violent conflict must be limited and constrained by the demands for justice and peace.
A leading English Sunday broadsheet has proclaimed: “This is not a just war”. But when is a war just? Is the “just war” theory simply a formula to allow Christians to participate in any and all wars? And, in the light of recent events, can the present war against Milosevic and the Yugoslav government be regarded as a “just war”? Over the centuries, the Christian tradition has produced three contrasting approaches to the moral dilemma posed by war: pacifism, Crusades, and the “just war” theory.
Christian pacifism, with its roots in the Sermon on the Mount and the practice of the early church, demands total opposition to all wars. However, the call to peacemaking in the Sermon on the Mount (Matthew 5: 9) is not a call to maintaining an unjust cessation of violence or to seeking peace at any price. Nor do the demands of peace always take priority over the demands of justice.
Those who invoke the principles of pacifism in the present conflict are open to condemnation if we have not spoken out against the tyranny of Milosevic, condemned the treatment of refugees and asylum-seekers in this country, or challenged the pervasive antipathy towards Muslims that has allowed the West to ignore the plight of Muslims in Bosnia and ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.
The Crusades found their initial justification as defensive action aimed at protecting Christian pilgrims to Jerusalem, but quickly took on all the characteristics of the jihad or Muslim holy war in which, ironically, Muslims became the victims.
The theological justification of Crusades has long been abandoned, but still has resonances in the way conservative Christians in the US talked about communist eastern Europe during the Cold War, or even today in the way many talk about a looming “clash of civilisations” between the West and the Islamic world.
The third Christian approach has been formulated as the “just war” theory. The concept of a just war owes its original formulation not to Biblical principles but to Aristotle, who first used the term, Cicero and others.
The theory was first framed by St Augustine, who was exercised by the problem of when a Christian might take part in a war with a good conscience.
For him, all wars remained sinful, and war could only be waged in “a mournful spirit”. War involved resorting to a lesser evil only in the hope of preventing a greater evil and of restoring justice. He accepted that the command to love our neighbour included a duty to defend the vulnerable against attack, while the commandment to love our enemy placed moral limits on the use of force in defending the vulnerable.
Augustine offered specific criteria for assessing the morality of warfare: the cause must be just, as must be the intention of those who embark on war; war must be declared by the proper, legitimate authority; and the conduct of the war must be just in every particular.
Augustine’s theory was later refined and developed in the 13th century by Thomas Aquinas, and by 16th-century Spanish and Dutch theologians. Their formula for a “just war” passed into international law, so that Francisco de Vitoria and Huig de Grotius are known to this day as the “Fathers of International Law”.
* * *
THE “just war” doctrine does not seek to legitimise, and still less to glorify, war. Today it is widely accepted by jurists and theologians alike that six conditions must govern a decision to go to war (jus ad bellum) and two conditions must govern its conduct (jus in bello). The six conditions governing any decision to go to war are: declaration by a legitimate authority; just cause; right intention; last resort; reasonable hope of success; and a due proportion between the benefits sought and the damage war will bring.
The two conditions which govern the conduct of war are: the principle of proportionality and the guaranteed immunity of non-combatants. Each of the conditions must be met for any conflict to meet the criteria for a “just war”.
Is it possible to regard the present conflict as a just war? Of course, it might even be asked whether this is a war. There has been no formal declaration of war; instead, there has been a formal declaration of the beginning of hostilities, and this has not come from a head of state. Whether the Secretary-General of NATO is an appropriate authority is open to question.
Undoubtedly, there is a just cause if the intention is to stop ethnic cleansing. But some British officials have said NATO’s aims and intentions are merely to show President Milosevic their resolve. Showing one's determination or flexing one's muscles does not justify bombing city-centres or putting maternity hospitals within firing range: has NATO clearly set out its intentions so that its cause is just?
The refusal of the Belgrade government to sign the Rambouillet accord despite weeks of negotiations may allow many to argue that this war is a last resort. But was there ever a reasonable hope of success? The just war theory also demands a due proportion between the benefits sought and the damage caused by war. If intensified ethnic cleansing was a foreseen consequence, then surely the sufferings brought about in the past two weeks are out of all proportion to any benefit in bringing Milosevic to the negotiating table.
On the other hand, NATO cannot be blamed for the actions of paramilitary racists, no more than the allied bombers can be blamed for Hitler intensifying the annihilation of Jews in the concentration camps.
Unfortunately, one of the weaknesses of the “just war” theory lies in the fact that it is often only long after a war is over that we have the time and the luxury to determine whether all conditions were met. In the meantime, we can only accept that all our moral decisions are contingent and at best penultimate rather than having ultimate or final value.
We are left to confess that war is evil, and accept that in circumstances such as these many people of good will resort to a lesser evil in the hope of preventing the perpetration of a greater evil.
Some years ago, when the Harvard theologian, Prof Harvey Cox, was asked who the new enemy of the West would be to replace eastern Europe in the post-Cold War world, he replied: “The poor”. Some weeks later the same question was put to the missionary theologian, Bishop Leslie Newbigin, who replied: “Islam”. It is ironic that in the present conflict those who are suffering most are both poor and Muslim.
Patrick Comerford is an Irish Times staff journalist and an Anglican lay theologian
This ‘Rite and Reason’ column was published in The Irish Times on Tuesday 6 April 1999
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)